This paper discusses the novel challenges to governance, mainly at the international level, posed by current proposals to manipulate the Earth’s radiative balance to reduce absorption of sunlight, in order to partly offset climate change being caused by elevated concentrations of greenhouse gases. While not new, these proposed interventions have become prominent and acutely contentious over the past few years, as the severity of climate-change risks society faces over coming decades have become increasingly evident – due to both continuing failure to achieve required sharp cuts in emissions, and remaining scientific uncertainties. Relative to the familiar responses to climate change – limiting the emissions causing change, and adapting human and natural systems to reduce the harmful impacts – these engineered interventions have three salient characteristics: they are cheap, fast, and imperfect. Because they can modify the global climate rapidly, within months of deployment, they are the only response that may allow limiting or reversing severe climate impacts once these have become sufficiently evident to motivate a response. But they pose many risks, of which their direct environmental impacts may well be the least serious – e.g., the risk that reliance on these imperfect interventions may further weaken already feeble efforts to cut emissions, lead to blind alleys where ongoing interventions cannot be stopped, or spur new international or inter-regional conflicts.
An effective governance system for these technologies must combine elements of scientific, regulatory, and security decision-making. The governance response must in part be scientific because specific methods are presently undeveloped and their consequences weakly understood. Research is needed to assess their potential benefits and harms, regionally and globally. The governance response must be in part regulatory, in that it will have to decide who may make what interventions, under what conditions, with what provision for risk assessment, monitoring, and liability and compensation. And the response must resemble security decision-making because it is plausible – indeed, even likely – that some nations may perceive fundamental interests to be at stake in the amount and character of climate change they suffer, through whatever mix of changes in response to greenhouse-gas forcing and intentional interventions to limit these changes – and will be prepared to fight over these. In addition to providing sufficiently legitimate decision-making to authorize what is done, when and by whom, governance of these technologies must also be able to deter unauthorized deployment, limit and compensate for harms, and prevent or limit resultant conflicts. Even at the national level the integration of scientific, regulatory, and security decision-making is uneven and often weak, and no present international regime effectively combines all three of these modes of policy-making. Control of these technologies may require substantial expansion of governance authority at the international level, and substantial delegation of authority to expert-based scientific processes – each of these representing intensely challenging, and intensely contentious, departures from current policy traditions and practices. The paper will sharpen these challenges and propose a few near-term steps to manage them.
[Paper]